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STEERING AWAY FROM THE ARBITRATION PROCESS:
RECOGNIZING STATE LAW TORT ACTIONS FOR UNIONIZED
EMPLOYEES
I. INTRODUCTION
When an employer and a labor union negotiate over an employment
contract, their agreements are usually set forth in a collective bargaining
agreement. The collective bargaining agreement defines the relationship
between the employer and the unionized employees and addresses such
matters as wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Addition-
ally, collective bargaining agreements usually include grievance proce-
dures and arbitration clauses to resolve disputes between the employer
and the unionized employees.1
Frequently, unionized employees bypass the grievance procedures and
file suit against the employer in court based on a state law claim.2 The
employer usually responds with a motion to dismiss on grounds that the
employee's claim is preempted by federal labor law under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act.3
These state law claims have generated much debate over the scope of
federal preemption. At the center of the debate is the apparent conflict
between the original interpretation of section 301 and the United States
Supreme Court's recent holdings recognizing state law rights for union-
ized employees.
This Note will examine the preemptive effect of section 301 since the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lingle v. Norge Divi-
sion of Magic Chef, Inc.4 as contrasted with the principles underlying sec-
tion 301 since its inception.5 After a discussion of the history of section
1. Arbitration was provided for in 99% of 400 sample collective bargaining agreements
examined by the Bureau of National Affairs. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PAT-
TERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (11th ed. 1986).
2. Several reasons may exist for the employee to bypass the grievance procedures. The
employee might be dissatisfied with the union and its representation of the claim. The em-
ployee may also want to recover under state law because it usually provides a larger
recovery.
3. Employers claim section 301 preemption as a defense because the usual result is dis-
missal of the claim for failure to exhaust the grievance procedures as the mode of redress.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). The claim may also be dismissed
for failure to file a grievance within the six-month statute of limitations under the Labor
Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
5. If section 301 does not preempt the state law claim, it may be preempted by other
sections of the Labor Management Relations Act. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (preemption by sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor
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301, an analysis of the federal circuit courts' treatment of the Lingle deci-
sion will provide insight into the future preemptive effect of section 301.
The note will then consider whether this result is consistent with Con-
gress' intent when it enacted the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947.
II. THE HISTORY AND SCOPE OF SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
A. Early Interpretation of Section 301
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this [Act], or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.'
The purpose of section 301 was first examined by the United States
Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.7 The Court
held that Congress enacted section 301 to create a uniform body of fed-
eral law governing enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.8 This
case laid the foundation for future treatment of section 301.
In a line of cases known as the Steelworkers trilogy,9 the Court de-
clared that arbitration should be the method of labor dispute resolution
unless the parties to the dispute expressly agree not to submit the matter
to arbitration."0 Any doubts as to whether the dispute is governed by the
arbitration clause will be resolved in favor of arbitration.'" The Court
stated that an arbitrator is more competent to settle a labor dispute since
Relations Act).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
7. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The suit arose when the employer refused to submit the union's
grievance to arbitration. The court of appeals held that the district court had the authority
to hear the suit under section 301, but it had no authority under federal or state law to
grant relief. Id. at 449.
8. See id. at 456. Federal statutes as well as legislative policies could be used to create
this new body of federal labor law. State law could be used if it was compatible with the
purpose of section 301, but it would not be an independent source of private rights. Id. at
457.
9. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In each of these cases, the union sued the employer
to compel arbitration of grievances which arose under the collective bargaining agreement.
10. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582. Arbitration would be a stabilizing influ-
ence only if it was used to resolve any and all disputes arising under the collective bargain-
ing agreement. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567.
11. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 583.
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the arbitrator is more versed in the practices of the industry and the com-
mon law of the shop. 2
The Court, in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.13, considered
the preemptive effect of section 301 for the first time.14 In Lucas Flour,
the employer sued the union for damages in a state court after the union
called a strike to protest the firing of an employee. 15 In holding that the
strike violated the collective bargaining agreement, the Court stressed the
importance of applying uniform federal law, rather than inconsistent local
rules, to cases involving labor disputes.'" The Court also emphasized the
need for arbitration in settling these disputes. According to the Court,
avoiding the arbitration clause in the contract violates the principles of
traditional contract law and hinders the national labor policy of encour-
aging arbitration to settle labor disputes."'
The preemptive effect of section 301 was later expanded through the
application of the "complete preemption" doctrine., s As a result, any
state law claim would be preempted if it concerned rights directly related
or substantially dependent on terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.'" The "complete preemption" doctrine was applied to section 301
12. Id. at 581-82.
13. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
14. The United States Supreme Court had earlier concluded that state courts as well as
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear section 301 claims, although federal law must be
applied. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
15. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 97. This case is unusual in that the employer filed suit, not
the employee. The rest of the cases analyzed in this Note will involve employees suing their
employers.
16. Justice Stewart makes this point clear in his opinion, stating:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective [bargaining] agreements.
... The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free
and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote
industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the
smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor
policy.
Id. at 103-04.
17. Justice Stewart stated that the basic policy of national labor law was to promote arbi-
tration as a "substitute for economic warfare." Id. at 105. Although there was not a no-
strike provision in the labor contract, the Court found that both parties expressly agreed to
settle the dispute through final and binding arbitration. Id. at 106.
18. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1983). Under the "complete preemption" doctrine, the preemptive force of a federal statute
is so extraordinary that it converts a state law complaint into a federal claim for purposes of
the well pleaded complaint rule. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
19. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). In Caterpillar, the em-
ployer made individual contracts with its employees promising them indefinite employment.
Id. at 388. After being fired, the employees sued the employer in state court alleging breach
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to deter plaintiffs' attempts to avoid preemption solely by pleading a
state law claim.2"
B. Recognized Private Rights of Action for Unionized Employees
The United States Supreme Court has held that unionized employees
have substantive rights independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.21 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2 2 the Court held that the
arbitration process was not the sole remedy for a unionized employee's
claim of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The
Court stated that, while an arbitrator's decision can address the norms of
industrial relations, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is
the primary responsibility of the courts.23
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,2 4 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld wage claims brought by employees under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Although wages and hours were usually the pri-
mary considerations in a collective bargaining agreement, the Court
stated that the congressional intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act was
to protect workers from substandard wages and oppressive working
hours. 25 Allowing the employer and the union to abridge these rights
of their individual employment contracts. Id. at 390. The Court held that the individual
contracts were not preempted by section 301 since they existed independently of a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 396.
20. The Court stated that the plaintiff, as the master of his complaint, still had control
over the choice of forum if his claim did not interpret a term in the labor contract. Id. at
398-99.
21. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (Maine severance pay
statute not preempted); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987) (action
under Federal Employer's Liability Act not preempted); McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984) (section 1983 claim based on first amendment not preempted); Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (claim under Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act not preempted); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (racial dis-
crimination claim not preempted).
22. 415 U.S. at 36. Arbitration is not the sole remedy; moreover, it is an "inappropriate
forum" for resolving civil rights in comparison with judicial process. Id. at 56-57.
23. Id. at 57. The Court also stated that the arbitrator's task was to effectuate the intent
of the parties according to the "industrial common law of the shop." The arbitrator, how-
ever, had no authority to enforce public laws which exceeded the scope of the bargain be-
tween the parties. Id. at 53.
24. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
25. Id. at 738-39. The Court's opinion stated the following:
In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act, which was designed to minimize
industrial strife and to improve working conditions by encouraging employees to pro-
mote their interests collectively, the FLSA was designed to give specific minimum
protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the
Act would receive "'[a] fair day's pay for a fair day's work'" and would be protected
from "the evil of 'overwork' as well as 'underpay.'"
Id. at 739 (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting
81 CONG. Rzc. 4983 (1937) (message of President Roosevelt))). The Court also relied on the
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would "nullify the purposes" of the statute.2" Chief Justice Burger's dis-
sent sharply criticized the majority for allowing an employee access to the
federal courts for an issue which could adequately be resolved through
arbitration."
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,2 8 the Court upheld a claim under
a Maine statute which set minimum standards for severance pay. The
Court stated that preemption should not be lightly inferred since the es-
tablishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of
the states. 29 The Court also stated that nothing in the National Labor
Relations Act foreclosed all state regulatory power over issues which are
subject to collective bargaining.30
C. The Allis-Chalmers Test for Section 301 Preemption
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,31 the United States Supreme Court
expanded the preemptive effect of section 301 to include state law tort
claims which sought to interpret a contract term.32 In Allis-Chalmers, a
unionized employee claimed that his employer handled the employee's in-
surance payments in bad faith.33 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
section 301 applied only to violations of labor contracts.3 4 Under Wiscon-
sin law, the tort of bad faith is independent of a contract even though a
breach of duty arises from the contractual relationship.35 Therefore, the
court held that the employee's claim was not preempted by section 301
since the employee did not allege a violation of the labor contract.3 s
fact that the FLSA gave individual employees access to the courts to resolve their claims.
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740.
26. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740 (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697,
707 (1945)). The Court was also concerned that the union might not vigorously support a
wage claim and that the arbitrator might lack the competence to correctly interpret the
statute. Id. at 742-43.
27. Id. at 746 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978)).
31. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
32. The Court stated the preemptive effect of section 301 must extend beyond suits alleg-
ing contract violations in order to further the policies of creating a uniform labor law for the
interpretation of terms in the labor contract. Id. at 210-11.
33. Id. at 206. The collective bargaining agreement incorporated by reference an insur-
ance plan and contained a grievance procedure which covered disputes over disability pay-
ments. Id. at 204. The employee's state law claim alleged breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing resulting in emotional distress, physical impairment and pain and suffering.
Id. at 206.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the em-
ployee's claim was preempted since it was "inextricably intertwined" with
the terms of the labor contract.37 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
developed a test for section 301 preemption. Under this test, section 301
preempts state law if resolution of the claim depends substantially on the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement .3
Applying this test to the employee's claim, the Court found that the
Wisconsin tort "intrinsically relates to the nature and existence of the
contract" because whether the employer acted in bad faith can only be
determined by knowing the rights and duties imposed by the labor con-
tract.3 9 Thus, the tort must be analyzed in light of the terms of the con-
tract; it is not independent of the labor contract. 40
The Court noted that the Wisconsin decision would allow the same suit
to be brought in state court without first exhausting the grievance proce-
dures in the collective bargaining agreement.41' A rule which permitted
such a result "would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness." 42
After Allis-Chalmers, interpretation of section 301 requires the appli-
cation of federal law to disputes concerning collective bargaining agree-
ments. The United States Supreme Court's decisions reflect the policies
of maintaining uniform federal law and preserving arbitration. State law
has prevailed only when a statute has provided minimum substantive
guarantees for its employees.
III. THE NEW TEST FOR SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
A. The Mandate of Lingle
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,43 the Supreme Court
37. See id. at 218. The Court's analysis focused on whether the state tort conferred non-
negotiable rights on employees or whether the tort was "inextricably intertwined" with the
terms of the labor contract. Id. at 213. The Court noted that, under Wisconsin law, the
parties were free to bargain over the performance of the insurance contract. In essence, the
claim was a dispute over a contractual term and federal labor law should be applied. Id. at
217.
38. See id. at 220. The Court also stated that disputes only tangentially involving the
terms of a labor contract would not be preempted by section 301. Id. at 211.
39. Id. at 216-17.
40. Id. at 218.
41. Id. at 219. The parties also had a federal right to choose the forum for resolution of
contract disputes. The parties chose arbitration. Allowing an employee to bypass the arbi-
tration process would destroy the parties' right to choose the forum. Id.
42. Id. at 220.
43. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). Lingle attempted to resolve a split among circuit courts re-
garding retaliatory discharge claims. Compare Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div.,
United Technologies Corp., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (retaliatory discharge claim not pre-
empted by section 301), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988) and Herring v. Prince Maca-
roni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) (no preemption) and Peabody Gallon v. Dollar, 666
238 [Vol. 24:233
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formulated the most recent test for section 301 preemption. In Lingle, an
employee sued her employer for allegedly discharging her after she had
filed a worker's compensation claim.4 4 Illinois law required the employee
to prove not only that she was discharged or threatened with discharge,
but also that the employer's motive for discharging her was to deter her
from filing a worker's compensation claim.45 Relying on Allis-Chalmers,
the district court and court of appeals dismissed the employee's suit,
holding that it was "inextricably intertwined" with the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.46
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Illinois
tort of retaliatory discharge redresses conduct of the employee and the
motivation of the employer, and neither element requires the interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement.47 In reaching its decision, the
Court fashioned a new rule for section 301 preemption. After Lingle, "an
application of state law is preempted by section 301 . . .only if such ap-
plication requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement. '4 s
In deciding the preemption issue, the Court first examined Illinois law
regarding retaliatory discharge.49 After reviewing the elements of the tort,
the Court found that none required interpretation of any terms in the
collective bargaining agreement.5 Therefore, the employee's claim was
not preempted by section 301.
B. Comparing Lingle with the History of Section 301
The possible effect of Lingle on section 301 preemption is not evident
unless the case is compared with Allis-Chalmers and Lucas Flour. Only
F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981) (no preemption) with Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1986) (retaliatory discharge preempted by section 301).
44. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879.
45. Id. at 1882 (quoting Horton v. Miller Chem. Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985)
(summarizing Illinois court decisions), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986)).
46. The court of appeals also based its holding on the fact that the court would be analyz-
ing the same set of facts as the arbitrator. Id. at 1879. For the opinion of the district court,
see Lingle, 618 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987). For the
opinion of the court of appeals, see Lingle, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd,
486 U.S. 399 (1988).
47. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
48. Id. at 1885.
49. See id. at 1881-82. The Court relied on Illinois case law, not statutory law, to find
that Illinois recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge. The Court further found that Illi-
nois allowed retaliatory discharge claims brought by employees covered by union contracts.
Id. Justice Stevens noted that the Allis-Chalmers Court examined the collective bargaining
agreement before consulting Wisconsin law. Id. at 1881. This distinction will be discussed
later in the Note.
50. See id. at 1882.
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then is it clear that Lingle may have an adverse effect on the arbitration
process.
The Lingle Court relied on Allis-Chalmers and stressed that its holding
was consistent with the Lucas Flour policies governing enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. 1 However, in Lingle the Court stated
that the broad contractual protection against discriminatory discharge
did not make state law dependent upon the labor contract.2
There are two points which distinguish Allis-Chalmers from Lingle. Al-
lis-Chalmers focused on the duties and rights of the parties established
by the labor contract to determine whether the state tort was dependent
on the collective bargaining agreement.53 Lingle did not address the
rights and duties under the collective bargaining agreement; the Court
viewed such inquiry as irrelevant, unless analysis of the state tort re-
quired interpretation of the agreement.5 4
Lingle essentially ignored the term in the labor contract which pro-
vided for dispute resolution through arbitration. In contrast, Allis-Chal-
mers emphasized the provisions in the contract to preserve arbitration as
the primary forum for resolving labor disputes.5 While Lingle gave the
employee the option of using arbitration or the courts to resolve the em-
ployee's dispute,5" Allis-Chalmers stated that arbitration would be se-
51. Id. at 1884. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
The result we reach today is consistent both with the policy of fostering uniform,
certain adjudication of disputes over the meaning of collective bargaining agreements
and with cases that have permitted separate fonts of substantive rights to remain
unpre-empted by other federal labor-law statutes.
... Today's decision should make clear that interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can determine questions of
state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require
construing collective-bargaining agreements.
Id. (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 1885. The Court relied on language in the Allis-Chalmers opinion which stated
that disputes only tangentially related to the labor contract are not preempted. See Allis-
Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). The Court also relied on the cases recognizing
substantive minimum standards for unionized employees. See supra notes 21-30 and accom-
panying text.
53. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216-17.
54. See Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
55. The Allis-Chalmers Court stated "it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the re-
sponsibility to interpret the labor contract in the first instance." Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at
220. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act declares that the final resolu-
tion of disputes should be the method agreed to by the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
This policy can be enforced only if the means chosen by the parties is given full play.
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
56. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882-83. Lingle stated that both the arbitrator and the courts can
hear a labor dispute even though it may require interpreting the same set of facts. In fact, if
the employee first used the arbitration process and was unhappy with the results, she could
then resort to the courts to rehear her claim without being bound by the arbitrator's deci-
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verely weakened if "[c]laims involving vacation or overtime pay, work as-
signment, unfair discharge-in short, the whole range of disputes
traditionally resolved through arbitration-could be brought in the first
instance in state court.
'57
The line of cases recognizing substantive rights for unionized employ-
ees provides greater support for the Lingle decision.58 Most of these cases,
however, involved federal statutes which would not affect the uniformity
concerns of Lucas Flour.59 These federal statutes were also created to
remedy specific and self-evident national concerns.60 It is plausible that
the United States Supreme Court, in each of these cases, intended only to
remedy these national problems and did not intend to de-emphasize arbi-
tration as the preferred method of dispute resolution. 1 Additionally, the
Court was concerned with the arbitrator's ability to handle these federal
statutes.6 2
Fort Halifax involved a state statute, but the statute was designed to
set minimum standards for severance pay. Although the statute may have
affected collective bargaining by imposing a bargaining floor, the parties
were free to exceed this minimum standard in the labor contract. The
statute did not affect the arbitration process.
Two factors not mentioned in the Lingle opinion may have persuaded
the United States Supreme Court to allow the employee's state law tort
claim. The first factor is the Court's hesitancy to impute the union's ac-
ceptance of certain terms in the collective bargaining agreement, such as
arbitration, to its individual members.6 3 The second factor is the disparity
between the remedies available under state law and the remedies availa-
ble through arbitration. For instance, in Illinois an employee may recover
compensatory as well as punitive damages for retaliatory discharge." The
employee's award through arbitration, however, will most likely be lim-
ited to back pay. Thus, the Court may have been hesitant to force an
sion. But see Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting, Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1989).
57. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
58. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 21.
60. For a discussion on the interpretation of these cases, see Kinyon & Rohlik, "Deflour-
ing" Lucas Through Labored Characterizations: Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30
ST. Lobis U.L.J. 1, 43 (1985). [hereinafter Kinyon & Rohlik].
61. Id.
62. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742-43 (1981); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
63. Although the union may be a "reliable proxy" for most economic issues, member in-
terests are likely to diverge on certain issues of individual liberty. Bruff, Public Programs,
Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L.
REv. 441, 453 (1989) (commenting on the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. City of
West-Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984)).
64. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1878-79 (1988).
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employee to forego a more desirable state law remedy as a result of the
union's acceptance of arbitration as the final forum for dispute resolution.
IV. TREATMENT BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Initial Reaction to Lingle
After Lingle, the federal courts must use the following analysis to de-
termine whether a state law tort claim is preempted by section 301. The
courts must first examine the employee's complaint to determine the al-
leged claim. Second, the court must examine the relevant state law to
determine the elements of the claimed tort. Finally, the courts must de-
cide whether resolution of the state law claim requires interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
The federal circuit courts have applied the new test for preemption
under section 301 in numerous cases involving a myriad of state law tort
claims. Among the various torts are claims for retaliatory discharge, 5
wrongful discharge, 6 right to privacy, 7 intentional infliction of emotional
distress,6 8 and breach of contract.6 9 Other claims include breach of im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 0 tortious interference with
65. All of these cases upheld state claims for retaliatory discharge. See Griess v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., No. 87-1837 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1989); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp.,
879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989); Bettis v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 878 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.
1989); Curl v. General Tel. Co., 861 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1988); Wolfe v. Central Mine Equip.
Co., 850 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Merchant v. American S.S. Co., 860 F.2d 204 (6th
Cir. 1988) (federal maritime discharge claim not preempted by section 301).
66. All of the following cases, except one, have held that wrongful discharge claims are
preempted since the power of the employer to discharge an employee is defined in the labor
contract. See Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989); Shane v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1989); Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d
67 (8th Cir. 1988). But see Rintone v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 865 F.2d 1220 (lth
Cir. 1989) (not preempted). The Rintone opinion contained no analysis on why the claim
was not preempted. It relied solely on the Lingle decision for its holding.
67. See Utility Workers of Am., Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1530 (1988); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988);
Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988) (appeal pending). All of these
cases preempt state law actions based on drug testing provisions in the labor contract.
68. To date, notwithstanding the pendency of appeals, emotional distress cases have been
preempted by section 301. See Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877
F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1989); Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d at 620; Newberry v. Pacific Racing
Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988); Willis
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1988).
69. See "Vacca" v.Viacom Broadcasting of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1337 (8th Cir. 1989)
(claim preempted by section 301); De Lapp v. Continental Can Co., 868 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1989) (claim preempted).
70. See Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989) (claim pre-
empted by section 301).
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a contract,71 slander,72 fraud,73 and defamation.74 These suits commonly
claim several torts arising out of the same dispute.
75
The Lingle decision has been relied on most heavily by the federal cir-
cuit courts considering retaliatory discharge claims. The result is logical
since Lingle dealt directly with this issue. However, due to problems in
the Lingle analysis, the circuit courts have been hesitant to uphold other
state law claims.7 6 These problems include conflicting application of the
first step of the Lingle analysis and trouble in determining the state law
on a specific tort. Factors such as deference to the arbitration process
may also contribute to the limited number of state law torts which the
federal circuit courts have upheld over section 301 preemption challenges.
The first step in the Lingle analysis requires a determination of the
plaintiff's cause of action. It is unclear, however, whether the court should
look only at the face of the plaintiff's complaint or the complete factual
background of the case, including the defenses.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have stated that the plaintiff, based on
the well pleaded complaint rule, can choose the claim which he wishes to
pursue and that the defendant may not destroy the state law character of
the complaint by raising a federal defense.77 The Fourth and Eighth Cir-
cuits have stated that the entire factual background of the case, including
the defenses, must be examined to determine whether the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement are applicable.78 The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits relied on language in Caterpillar to come to their conclusions. 79
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, seem to have recog-
nized the effect of the "complete preemption" doctrine as applied to sec-
71. Compare Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989) (no preemption) with
Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d at 620 (claim preempted by section 301). For further discussion
on Dougherty, see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
72. See Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d at 620 (claim preempted); Willis, 840 F.2d at 254
(claim preempted).
73. Fraud is one of the few areas where a state law claim has been recognized. See Berda
v. CBS, Inc., No. 88-3405 (3d Cir. July 20, 1989).
74. See Meadows v. General Elec. Co., No. 88-2914 (4th Cir. May 10, 1989) (claim pre-
empted by section 301).
75. The courts must analyze each separate claim to determine whether it is preempted.
Therefore, it is possible that federal law will govern one claim while state law will govern a
second claim in the same suit. See, e.g., Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 69 (8th
Cir. 1988).
76. See supra notes 66-74.
77. Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989); Nelson v. Central Ill.
Light Co., 878 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1989).
78. Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1989); Hanks, 859 F.2d
at 70; Willis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254, 255 (4th Cir. 1988).
79. See Nelson, 878 F.2d at 202 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987)).
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tion 301.80 However, in analyzing both of these circuit courts' opinions, it
is unclear whether both correctly applied the teachings in Caterpillar.s l
The decision whether to look solely at the face of the complaint in de-
termining the plaintiff's cause of action can dictate whether preemption
will take place. If the plaintiff pleads a state law claim in which section
301 does not apply, preemption will be avoided. However, the complaint
will be preempted if it arises under the collective bargaining agreement.
The different treatment of wrongful discharge claims and retaliatory
discharge claims by the federal circuits exemplifies the importance of this
characterization. After Lingle, all of the circuit courts have held that a
retaliatory discharge claim is not preempted by section 301.82 In contrast,
nearly all courts have held that a wrongful discharge claim is preempted
by section 301.83 The differing treatment of the two claims lies in the
elements of each tort.
A retaliatory discharge claim involves examination into the employer's
motives for discharging an employee."4 The employer need only show that
his motives were not in retaliation for the employee's filing of a worker's
compensation claim."s If the court finds that the employer was motivated
by something other than retaliation then the employer's motive is
irrelevant.8 6
In a wrongful discharge claim, the employer's reasons for and authority
to discharge an employee are essential to the case. As a result, courts will
examine the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to ascertain the
employer's authority to control the workplace and the employee's
conduct."7
As exemplified above, preemption may depend on the circuit courts'
characterization of the employee's claim. 8 The characterization process is
80. These courts look to the defenses out of the fear that the plaintiff might try to avoid
preemption by relabeling his claim to one which is not preempted. See Willis, 840 F.2d at
255 (quoting Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)).
81. The Caterpillar Court stated that the defendant cannot destroy the nature of a plain-
tiff's state law claim merely by pleading a federal defense. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99.
However, the defenses raised by the defendant, if based on terms in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, must be analyzed to determine whether the court will have to interpret the
labor contract. Id.
82. See supra note 65.
83. See supra note 66.
84. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988).
85. Nelson v. Central Ill. Light Co., 878 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1989).
86. Id.
87. See Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1989); Shane v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 1989); Hanks v. General Motors Corp.,
859 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1988). But see Rintone v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 865 F.2d
1220, 1221 (11th Cir. 1989).
88. For an analysis of the problems inherent in claim characterization, see Twitchell,
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overemphasized when a dispute centers on the application of one of two
claims which are similar in nature but treated differently by the courts.
There is no reason why retaliatory discharge and wrongful discharge
should be treated differently. Retaliatory discharge is merely a subset of
wrongful discharge, and analyzing both of these torts involves the same
set of facts and circumstances surrounding the discharge of the employee.
The preemption result should be the same for both of these torts.
The second part of the Lingle analysis, determining the elements of the
state law tort, is a potential source of confusion in the circuit courts. Such
confusion is exemplified by the conflicting results of the federal circuits in
determining the elements for the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Missouri law on emotional distress
required the plaintiff to prove (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
employer; (2) intentional or reckless action by the employer; and (3) se-
vere emotional distress resulting from the employer's conduct."s The Sev-
enth Circuit, interpreting Illinois law, recognized the same elements but
further found specific law covering intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in the employer/employee context 0 Illinois law stated that an em-
ployer would not be liable where he legitimately exercised his legal rights,
even though it may have caused emotional distress.9'
The Eighth Circuit's definition does not require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the employer acted
with extreme and outrageous conduct.92 Therefore, the claim would not
be preempted. However, the Seventh Circuit's definition would require
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to deter-
mine whether the employer acted within his authority under the labor
contract.
93
As shown in the above example, determination of the preemption issue
will depend on the court's interpretation of the alleged state law tort.
Since tort law varies among states, a claim may be preempted in one cir-
cuit and not in another depending on the state law which the court
Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1986).
89. Hanks, 859 F.2d at 70.
90. See Douglas v. American Information Technologies, Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 571 (7th Cir.
1989).
91. Id. (quoting Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, -, 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1976)).
92. Hanks, 859 F.2d at 70.
93. Douglas, 877 F.2d at 572. Most of the circuit courts have followed the Douglas line of
reasoning. See Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1988); Hyles
v. Mensing, 849 F.2d at 1216; Willis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254, 255 (4th Cir.
1988).
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applies. "4
Another problem the circuit courts have encountered is the weight, if
any, to be placed on the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Under Lingle, if a state law does not require the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, the labor contract does not need to be
referenced or even produced at trial. The court would need to look only
at the relevant state law to decide the case. However, some courts have
examined the collective bargaining agreement before considering the state
law.9 5 The most likely reason for this is that many courts still rely heavily
on Allis-Chalmers, which held that the collective bargaining agreement
determined the rights and duties of the parties. In fact, many courts men-
tion Lingle only after they have performed the Allis-Chalmers analysis.96
The courts' reliance on Allis-Chalmers is understandable, considering
most tort claims brought by employees involve issues concerning the em-
ployer/employee relationship and whether one of the parties deviated
from the common practices of the workplace. Determining the working
relationship can usually be done only with reference to the collective bar-
gaining agreement. This may be the reason behind the federal courts' re-
fusal to extend the Lingle analysis beyond cases involving retaliatory dis-
charge claims.
B. The Future of the Lingle Analysis
Shortly after Lingle, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to several cases in which employee tort claims were preempted.9 7 The
Court vacated the judgment of these cases and remanded them for a new
hearing in light of Lingle. The state law torts pleaded in these cases con-
sisted not only of retaliatory discharge claims, but also of torts such as
defamation,98  wrongful discharge,99 and tortious interference with
94. The state may have specific statutory law, rely on the common law, or may not even
recognize the particular tort in issue.
95. See, e.g., Willis, 840 F.2d at 255.
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d at 620-23.
97. See Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989) (decision on remand), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2812 (1988); Clark v. Momence Packing Co., 828 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2813 (1988); Willoughby v. Central Ill. Light
Co., 826 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2812
(1988); Lastimoso v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 823 F.2d 1552 (9th Cir. 1987) (unpublished opin-
ion), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2814 (1988); Hanneken v. Dixon Distrib. Co., 822 F.2d 1091
(7th Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2813 (1988); DeSoto v. Yel-
low Freight Sys., Inc., 820 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2813 (1988);
Mays v. Reynolds Metal Co., 516 So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2814
(1988). The state law claims in these cases were preempted before the Supreme Court re-
manded them.
98. See Mays, 516 So. 2d at 518. In Mays, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the
employee's defamation claim was preempted since it would prevent the employer from con-
[Vol. 24:233246
RECOGNIZING STATE LAW ACTIONS
contract. 00
The tortious interference with contract suit was subsequently found
not to be preempted by section 301.?0' The Sixth Circuit held that a state
law claim against a party who did not sign the labor contract would not
affect the contractual relationship* between the employer and the
employee.102
Perhaps the most important case on remand involved a wrongful dis-
charge claim. In DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,0 3 an employee
brought a wrongful discharge action against his employer after being dis-
charged for refusing to drive a trailer. The employee mistakenly believed
that the trailer's registration had expired and, therefore, refused to drive
the trailer.10 4 The employee brought suit under California law which al-
lowed claims for wrongful discharge based on public policy reasons.10 5
The Ninth Circuit held that the employee's claim was preempted by sec-
tion 301.108
This case is important for two reasons. First, a holding that a wrongful
discharge claim is not preempted may alter other circuit courts' treat-
ment of similar claims.107 Second, and more importantly, a holding that a
state law tort based on a public policy is not preempted will expand the
state's power to provide tort remedies for unionized employees based
solely on that state's own public policy reasons.
The Court's granting of certiorari to the above cases shows the Court's
intent to permit states to provide unionized employees with state law tort
remedies in addition to the remedies they have under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.108 As a result, the principles of Allis-Chalmers and
Lucas Flour will be subtly overruled.
ducting a routine and proper investigation. Id. at 519.
99. DeSoto, 820 F.2d at 1434.
100. Dougherty, 872 F.2d at 767.
101. Id. at 771.
102. Id. Ohio's law on tortious interference with contractual relations states that one who,
without privilege to do so, purposely causes a person not to enter into a business relation-
ship with another is liable for any harm caused. Id. at 770.
103. DeSoto, 820 F.2d at 1435.
104. Id. at 1438.
105. Id. at 1436-37.
106. Id. at 1438. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee was not acting in defense of
public policy, but incorrectly asserting his own interpretation of the law. Id. The court rea-
soned that this kind of dispute was appropriate for resolution through the grievance proce-
dure. Id.
107. The recognition of wrongful discharge claims for unionized employees in this case
will most likely have the same effect on the courts that Lingle had on retaliatory discharge
claims.
108. Note that all of the cases on remand held that the state law tort claims were pre-
empted by section 301 before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See supra note 97.
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V. AN ARGUMENT FOR ARBITRATION
The Lingle analysis is straightforward and will produce more consistent
results than the Allis-Chalmers test. However, whether the Lingle analy-
sis preserves the arbitration process as the forum for interpreting collec-
tive bargaining agreements is highly questionable.'0 9 A strong argument
can be made that the Lingle rule will weaken the arbitration process and
create a body of labor law with inconsistent state rules. A stronger argu-
ment can be made that arbitration is more than adequate to resolve labor
disputes without resorting to the state courts.
Lingle states that even though an arbitrator would be considering the
same set of facts, a state court may entertain a unionized employee's tort
claim so long as the state law does not require interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.110 Thus, a term in the collective bargaining
agreement expressly requiring arbitration for the claimed dispute will be
ignored, even though the arbitration clause was a vital part of the con-
tract upon which the employer and the union agreed."' Moreover, the
collective bargaining agreement itself is more than a document containing
specific contract terms.'12 It is a generalized source of rights, both express
and implied, governing the working relationship between the employer
and the employee.113 Negotiation of these rights must be done in a volun-
tary environment where the union and the employer are free to bargain
over the terms of the contract. The creation of state rights for unionized
employees would conflict with the freedom to contract and lead to the
application of inconsistent state laws to unionized employee claims.""
Since these rights would inevitably vary from state-to-state, an employer
with plants nationwide must determine whether certain terms in the col-
lective bargaining agreement will be enforceable in each particular
state." 5 The United States Supreme Court in Lucas Flour and Lincoln
Mills sought to avoid a system where labor laws differ among states.
There is nothing unfair about requiring unionized employees to use the
arbitration process for settling disputes. Although the individual employ-
109. See generally Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda
for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 59-66 (1988).
110. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1883.
111. See Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 60, at 64.
112. Douglas v. American Information Technologies, Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir.
1989).
113. Id. at 573.
114. Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 60, at 62.
115. See Rutkowski, Federal Preemption Versus States' Rights, 40 LABOR L.J. 105, 107
(1989). A conflict of laws problem could arise with conflicting state laws. If an employee in
State A sues his national employer and State A does not recognize the claimed tort, the
employee could bring suit in State B which does recognize the tort if the employer does
business in State B. See Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 60, at 62.
[Vol. 24:233
RECOGNIZING STATE LAW ACTIONS
ees may not have participated in the negotiations, they did agree to ac-
cept the terms which were negotiated by the union representatives. To
say that the unionized employee is sacrificing substantive rights given to
nonunionized employees is to assume that arbitration and collective bar-
gaining are inadequate.1 6
Unionized employees have a stronger bargaining position than individ-
ual employees. As a result, the union can secure benefits that the individ-
ual employees cannot. In securing these benefits, the union may have to
sacrifice certain other rights. The unionized- employee has received the
benefits of the labor contract; it is fair to require the employee to accept
the disadvantages."'
Although the employee may collect a larger award under a state law
tort action, the final amount received will be considerably less after de-
ducting attorneys' fees and various court expenses. If the employee uses
arbitration, the union will represent the employee free of charge. Arbitra-
tion will also be quicker and less costly for all the parties involved. If the
union fails to represent the employee adequately or refuses to arbitrate,
the employee may sue the employer and the union."'
Commentators and judges have stated that arbitrators are often more
effective than courts in resolving labor disputes." 9 The arbitrator pos-
sesses specific knowledge of the workplace and the customs of the indus-
try. Furthermore, the arbitrator is better suited to resolve labor disputes
in accordance with the intent of the parties.2 0 The courts cannot and
116. One commentator has stated that unionized employees would have to "pay for ele-
mentary industrial justice at the bargaining table, even though a state grants it free of
charge." Klare, supra note 109, at 66.
117. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, -, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213, 217 (1975), aft'd, 40 N.Y.2d
921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976). The Antinore case also stated that an em-
ployee waives certain due process requirements by voluntarily agreeing to submit disputes
to an arbitration process which dispenses with certain constitutional rights. Id. at -, 371
N.Y.S. 2d at 216.
118. An employee may sue the employer under federal law if the union controls the griev-
ance procedures and wrongfully refuses to submit the employee's claim to arbitration. The
employee may also join the union as a defendant for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-87 (1967).
119. Arbitrators can use common sense more than courts, and adversaries are usually
more satisfied with arbitration awards than those issued by the courts. See Kinyon & Roh-
lik, supra note 60, at 54. "[A]rbitrators have not functioned as mere factfinders, but, in fact,
have not hesitated to interpret collective bargaining agreements in the context of the chang-
ing society and have been continuously mindful of expanding protection of individuals in
the society." Id. at 61. The most experienced judge cannot bring the same competence to
bear upon the determination of a grievance as an arbitrator because the judge cannot be
similarly informed. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
120. Workplaces vary widely in their own procedures, customs, and understandings. A
determination in a particular case as to whether a termination decision was made in good
faith would be difficult for a court that does not possess specific knowledge of the workplace
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should not be expected to handle such a dispute with the same level of
expertise.
Perhaps the most detrimental result of allowing a unionized employee
to bypass the arbitration process would be the increased flow of cases into
the court system. Congress and other branches of the government have
endorsed the use of arbitration to alleviate the burden on the overloaded
court system. 2' Arbitration provides a quick and inexpensive method of
resolving disputes in comparison to the time consuming and expensive
nature of litigation.'22
If the remedies available to the employee are inadequate, the federal
government, not the states, should take steps to correct the deficiencies.
Federal supervision is the only way to ensure the creation of a uniform
body of federal labor law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of section 301, as interpreted by the United States Su-
preme Court, is to require courts to apply uniform federal labor law to
disputes which depend on collective bargaining agreements. The policies
of promoting uniform labor law and arbitration have been emphasized in
the Court's interpretation of section 301 since Lucas Flour.
The Court's recent decision in Lingle, although stressing these same
principles, may threaten the use of arbitration as an alternate and effec-
tive forum for resolving labor disputes, by granting state law tort reme-
dies to unionized employees. The impact of Lingle will become clear only
after the courts correctly apply the Lingle test to claims other than retali-
atory discharge.
To preserve the effectiveness of arbitration, disputes for which the col-
lective bargaining agreement requires arbitration should be heard by the
arbitrator and not the courts. Allowing a unionized employee the option
of pursuing a state tort claim will not only result in a waste of time and
money to both the employee and the employer, but will also place an
added strain on the already burdened court system.
Although the states' interest in protecting their citizens is legitimate,
arbitration can adequately resolve labor disputes between the employer
and the employee. Honoring all of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement is necessary in creating uniform federal labor law and preserv-
and the expectations and understandings of those who work there. Leonard, A New Com-
mon Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REV. 631, 657 (1988).
121. For a summary of studies on the feasibility and need for arbitration, see Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 748-49, 752-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 748.
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ing the arbitration process. The United States Supreme Court should re-
consider Lingle and its effect on federal labor law.
David C. Gardiner, Jr.

